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Abstract: 
While politicians in the United Kingdom have engaged in fractious debate over the appropriate way 
of responding to the myriad issues arising from the so-called migration or refugee crisis in recent 
years, there is an apparent cross-party consensus regarding the ability of overseas aid and 
development spending to reduce levels of global economic migration. This suggests that the central 
tenets of what is known in the policy literature as the ‘migration-development nexus’ have been 
accepted by the political establishment in the UK, who demonstrate a belief that development 
spending can be used to ameliorate the global economic inequalities seen as giving rise to mass 
migration. Drawing on Michel Foucault’s concepts of biopolitics, governmentality and 
subjectification, this article argues that the migration-development nexus represents a technology 
for enacting a strategy of governance that operates through a dual process of enticing and 
maintaining mobile subjects. It is then suggested that in the UK context this operates through the 
temporary nature of the time-limited visa regime, which allows migrants from outside the European 
Union to be ‘governed through mobility’. The article therefore illustrates how mobility can be central 

















While politicians in the United Kingdom (UK) have engaged in fractious debate over the appropriate 
way of responding to the myriad issues arising from the so-called migration or refugee crisis in and 
around the Mediterranean Sea in the last number of years, there is an apparent cross-party 
consensus regarding the ability of overseas aid and development spending to reduce levels of global 
economic migration. Both the Conservative government and Labour opposition have signalled their 
support for the continuation of the statutory requirement to spend 0.7% of gross national income on 
official development assistance (ODA), in part due to a belief that such spending can tackle the root 
causes of mass migration to Europe (Jamieson, 2016; HM Government, 2017b; Osamor, 2017). This 
suggests that the central tenets of what is known in the policy literature as the ‘migration-
development nexus’ have been accepted by the political establishment in the UK, with senior 
ministers and shadow ministers seemingly united in their belief that UK ODA can be used to 
ameliorate the global economic inequalities seen as giving rise to mass migration. 
While engaging with the policy-orientated literature on the migration-development nexus, this 
article will not provide a direct intervention into the technical or empirical sides of this debate. 
Instead, the work of migration scholars to debunk this hypothesis, by highlighting how economic 
development triggers rather than stems migration, will provide the point of departure for a critical 
investigation into policies of migration governance that flow from the acceptance of this nexus, such 
as the facilitation of remittance transfers, diasporic networks and temporary visa schemes. The 
article will develop Michel Foucault’s concepts of biopolitics, governmentality and subjectification to 
construct an argument that the migration-development nexus represents a biopolitical technology 
for enacting a wider strategy of governance that operates through a dual process of enticing and 
maintaining mobile subjects. Specifically, it will be argued that in the UK context this operates 
through the temporary nature of the time-limited visa regime, which allows non-European Union 
(EU) migrants to be ‘governed through mobility’, in the sense of being produced as mobile and 
movable. This argument will provide both an advance in Foucauldian scholarship, in the sense of 
clarifying the role of mobility in governance strategies, and a practical demonstration of the 
continuing relevance of Foucault’s key ideas in relation to the contemporary management of 
migration. Furthermore, the article will be of interest to scholars working on migration and mobility 
studies more generally, by producing new knowledge that can allow for the recognition of 
governmental practices that entice and maintain mobility, and by illustrating how mobility can be 
central to governing logics as well as something that can exceed them. 
This argument will proceed across the three sections of the article. The first section discusses the 
main features of the migration-development nexus discourse, and considers its impact on migration 
policy in the UK. The second section situates the valorisation of mobility by the migration-
development nexus within Foucault’s analysis of the centrality of circulation to biopolitical 
governance, before going beyond this to develop my novel understanding of the migration-
development nexus as operating to ‘govern through mobility’. The final section illustrates how this 
form of governance functions through the UK visa regime. The conclusion considers the future 
research agendas that are opened up by this conceptualisation, particularly in the context of the 
UK’s withdrawal from the EU. 
The Migration-Development Nexus  
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In the early 2000s policy-makers and academics working on migration and development began 
exploring the productive links that could be forged between the two areas, resulting in a great 
‘international buzz’ (Vammen and Brønden, 2012) around the notion of a ‘migration-development 
nexus’. This term captures the optimistic belief that the twin problems of growing levels of migration 
and the failures of development strategies could be best tackled together, by harnessing the 
economic benefits brought about by migration to the service of international development (Ruhs, 
2005). This migration-development orthodoxy views migrants as potential transnational agents of 
development (Brønden, 2012: 2), due both to the massive increase in recent years of the value of 
remittance transfers from high- to lower- and middle-income countries (De Haas, 2012: 9), and the 
possibility of migrants returning home with additional skills and capital to invest in their local 
economies (Datta, 2009: 112). International groups such as the Global Commission on International 
Migration (GCIM) and the Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD) have been set up to 
investigate the best ways to facilitate, encourage and manage these trends, hoping to produce 
‘triple wins’ for migrant-sending countries, migrant-receiving countries and migrants themselves 
(Lavenex and Kunz, 2008: 447) by facilitating remittance transfers, replacing the ‘brain drain’ from 
developing to developed countries with a ‘brain gain’ and incorporating migrant diasporas into 
development strategies, with the ultimate goal of bringing about eventual reductions in global levels 
of migration. As Geiger and Pécoud (2013: 369) emphasise, highlighting the connections between 
migration and development has produced some very specific policy prescriptions. When ‘the 
potential impact on world development of even a small liberalisation of labour mobility’ is 
foregrounded, ‘temporary and circulatory labour migration schemes’ emerge as the paragons ‘of 
“sound”, “balanced”, or “well-managed” immigration policies’. The creation of regularised channels 
for legal, cross-border temporary or circular migration1, to allow persons to circulate between a 
‘home’ and destination’ country, is therefore seen by proponents of the nexus as the best way to 
unleash the developmental potential of migration (Vammen and Brønden, 2012: 29; De Haas, 2012: 
22; Lavenex and Kunz 2008: 448-449).  
It is crucial to note, however, that this emphasis on creating legal routes for certain types of 
migration operates alongside a concerted effort to tighten and close off other channels for forms of 
migration considered ‘illegal’ or irregular. The discourses of the migration-development nexus must 
therefore be seen as complementing the wider logics of the securitisation of migration. The 
provision of (limited) channels for regularised migration can work to legitimise efforts to clamp 
down on the movement of people outside these channels, while development aid and more 
favourable immigration quotas are key bargaining chip in the outsourcing of border controls, as 
enacted by the EU’s ‘mobility partnerships’ with third country governments (Feldman, 2012: 73). The 
policies of the migration-development nexus can therefore not be practically separated from the 
securitisation of migration through practices such as the discursive linkage of migrants with 
transnational criminal and terror networks (Huysmans, 2006: 63-84), or the policies of surveillance, 
detention and deportation that follow from this securitisation. Furthermore, this securitisation 
cannot be separated from the irregular movement of people that it produces. 
In this article I will enact an apparent conceptual division, in order to focus my analysis on 
regularised and legal forms of migration. This is justified for two reasons. Firstly, there is an 
extensive and persuasive literature on the securitisation of migration, including many analyses of the 
biopolitics of practices of exclusion, confinement and marginalisation that irregular migrants are 
subjected to (Little and Vaughan-Williams, 2016; Tazzioli, 2016; Vaughan-Williams, 2015, 45-68). 
3 
 
Secondly, and more importantly, I wish to investigate the forms of governance that operate upon 
those seemingly more ‘privileged’ persons who are able to utilise regular channels of migration to 
the UK: those whose experience of migration is seemingly ‘smooth’. As I will highlight in the final 
section, even apparently ‘privileged’ or ‘elite’ migrants in the UK are subject to being ‘governed 
through mobility’, to seeing their previously ‘smooth’ experience turn bumpy and uneven – 
especially when immigration controls are conflated with national security concerns. However, before 
I begin to examine how such persons are ‘governed through mobility’, I must consider the impact of 
the migration-development nexus on UK migration policy.  
The Migration-Development Nexus and UK Migration Policy 
In the UK, the acceptance of the migration-development discourse can be seen not only in the 
commitment to ODA but in the policies which seek to promote and facilitate temporary or circular 
migration. This is quite limited in terms of explicit circular migration schemes, despite Gordon 
Brown’s government stating in a 2009 consultation on citizenship testing that they ‘would welcome 
views on whether we should facilitate circular migration in order to reduce the negative impact of 
brain drain on developing countries’ (UK Border Agency, 2009: 10). Some ad hoc circular migration 
programmes were put in place, such as the Medical Training Initiative (Royal College of Physicians, 
2016), but a plan to create a ‘pause button’ for migrants on the temporary Tier 1 or Tier 2 visas, to 
allow them to return home without jeopardising their path to citizenship status, was not acted upon. 
The same fate befell the planned Tier 3 visa, designed to provide a route for lower-skilled workers to 
come to the UK to fill temporary shortages in the labour market, which has been indefinitely 
suspended.  
There has been more active policy in terms of promoting diasporic networks and remittance 
transfers, however. The Department for International Development (DFID) provides financial 
support for diaspora groups engaged in development activities, in order to facilitate the 
maintenance of productive links between migrants living in the UK and their countries of origin. In 
2014, for example, DFID invested £12 million into the ‘Common Ground Initiative’, providing five 
years of funding to small UK-based diaspora-led organisations involved in development work across 
Africa (HM Government, 2017a). In 2013 the government set up an Action Group on Cross Border 
Remittances, bringing together financial groups such as the Association of UK Payment Institutions, 
the British Bankers Association and the World Bank with organs of government, including the 
Treasury, DFID, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the National Crime Agency, with the goal 
of identifying ‘market-led solutions for ensuring the continued flow of remittances’ (HM 
Government, 2015a)2. The government also tasked DFID with taking forward a pilot project to help 
develop secure remittance channels to Somalia (HM Government, 2012; HM Government, 2015b), 
and in May 2017 the issues of diaspora networks and remittance transfers were discussed at the 
London Conference on Somalia, attended by delegates from the governments of the UK and the 
Federal Republic of Somalia as well as from the United Nations and the African Union (HM 
Government, 2017b). The impetus to strengthen these transnational networks does not just come 
from government: the House of Commons International Development Committee’s 2016 report on 
DFID’s programmes in Nigeria bemoans the lack of mention ‘of the Nigerian diaspora in DFID’s latest 
Nigeria Operational Plan’, and urges DFID to ‘conduct a review into its engagement with British 
Nigerian diaspora groups… with the objective of ensuring that the substantial financial flows in the 
form of remittances and foreign direct investment (FDI) complement… [ODA] to the benefit of the 
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poorest Nigerians’ (House of Commons, 2016: 60). The focus of these activities on countries bound 
up with the UK’s imperial past highlights the connections between contemporary migration and 
development policy and European colonialism, which will be returned to below. 
Such policies can be seen as fitting the positive narrative put forward by proponents of the 
migration-development nexus regarding the potential of circulation (of migrant finance and migrants 
themselves) for addressing the twin policy problems of migration and development. However, this 
vision has not been uncritically accepted in the literature on migration and development. Some 
scholars view the migration-development nexus as a neoliberal mechanism operating to solicit the 
self-regulation of those produced as its subjects. Wise, Covarrubias, and Puentes (2013: 439), for 
instance, argue that the migration-development nexus operates to constitute migrants as subjects 
who are simultaneously valorised as ‘heroes of development’ capable of improving their own lives 
and the lives of those in their community through hard work and application, and rendered as 
‘subjects of new rules, expectations and burdens’. This fashioning of ‘ideal migrant subjects’ 
(Rodriguez and Schwenken, 2013: 381) involves the promotion of neoliberal tenets of responsibility, 
motivation and self-care, whereby migrants are encouraged to take on ‘increasingly individualised 
responsibilities for the development of their countries and communities of origin, in the context of... 
a shrinking state and privatisation of social services following the implementation of structural 
adjustment programmes in much of the developing world’ (Bastia, 2013: 466) Aspects of the critical 
literature on the migration-development nexus therefore view it as part of a neoliberal agenda 
aimed at enacting subjects who are both willing and able to further their own aims while 
simultaneously being subject to the wider dictates of neoliberal agendas.  
Even if setting aside the impact of policies inspired by the nexus on migrants, the effects it could 
have on reducing levels of migration is also seriously questioned in the literature. Hein de Haas 
challenges this key assumption of the migration-development nexus by arguing that ‘the process of 
social and economic development in its broadest sense tends to be associated with generally higher 
levels of mobility and more migration, at least in the short to medium term’ (De Haas, 2007: 832). 
Many contemporary migrants are not those fleeing absolute poverty but those with the human, 
financial and social resources to aspire to improve their lives, plan their journey and pay transit 
costs. This idea, known as the ‘migration hump’, suggests that as people are lifted out of absolute 
poverty by economic development levels of migration will increase rather than decrease.  
If the policies put forward by proponents of the migration-development nexus are unlikely to 
achieve their stated goals of tackling high levels of migration and low levels of development, why has 
the language of these proponents been adopted by the UK political establishment? I do not seek to 
give further credence to the empirical arguments that seek to highlight the likely failure of these 
policies: rather, following Foucault3, I seek to investigate the effects that the likely failure of the 
promotion of circular and temporary migration schemes have on UK migration policy. By situating 
the migration-development nexus within Foucault’s understanding of the centrality of circulation to 
contemporary governance, the following section will present the valorisation of circulation by the 
migration-development nexus as a biopolitical technology. This will provide the framework for the 
analysis in the final section of UK migration policy as governing through the enticement and 
maintenance of mobile subjects.  
Foucault, Biopolitics, Mobility 
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As well as promoting circular and temporary migration schemes, the discourses of the migration-
development nexus are built around a presupposition of the general value of human mobility. This 
valorisation of mobility is so strong that groups such as the GCIM celebrate ‘mobility... as a 
fundamental attribute of human nature’ (Feldman, 2012: 179). As I will now explore, this 
‘celebration of circulation’ (Faist, 2008: 26-27) by states, development agencies and international 
organisations appears comprehensible as an example of what Foucault calls an apparatus or 
dispositif of security. 
Security and circulation 
In the lecture series published under the title Security, Territory, Population, Foucault contrasts a 
legal-juridical model of power, associated with the exercise of sovereignty, with both disciplinary 
power and the operation of technologies of security. While he stresses that these modalities of 
power are not predominant in successive ages with clean breaks between them, but are rather 
overlapping and at times reinforcing, Foucault analyses the growing importance of security 
mechanisms in an age characterised by the emergence of what he called, in now well-known terms, 
‘biopower’ and ‘biopolitics’. Foucault (1990: 143) gave the name ‘biopower’, to the discourses which 
‘brought life and its mechanisms into the realm of explicit calculations and made knowledge-power 
an agent of transformation of human life’, and used the term ‘biopolitics’ to describe the ‘series of 
interventions and regulatory controls’ designed to normalise and maintain the population of living 
beings constructed as the object and subject of biopower (Foucault, 1990: 39, emphasis in original). 
‘Biopolitical governance’ therefore operates by embedding regulatory measures such as health and 
welfare provision, informed by biological and statistical sciences, into its strategies, with the aim of 
safeguarding and securing the vitality of a population.  
With the movement away from a sovereign power exercised over a demarcated territory to a 
biopower exercised over a population of living beings, security therefore becomes an ever-more 
prevalent form of governing the living: and it does so not by confining bodies in enclosures where 
they may be punished or worked upon by disciplinary power4, but by opening up spaces to 
circulation (Elden, 2007: 30). In the opening lecture of Security, Territory, Population Foucault (2007: 
13, 16, 17) talks repeatedly of the attempts to solve or mitigate the ‘problem of circulation’ through 
town planning in the 18th Century. A major issue of this time, he argues, was ‘resituating the town in 
a space of circulation’ (Foucault, 2007: 13), with innovations in architectural design aimed at 
organising the circulation of people and goods in such a way as to ‘eliminat[ate] its dangerous 
elements, making a division between good and bad circulation, and maximising the good circulation 
by diminishing the bad’ (Foucault, 2007: 18). In this understanding, circulation is seen as a 
phenomenon that security mechanisms seek to manage. While these security mechanisms shape 
and alter this circulation, they do not create it: rather, circulation is a ‘problem’ to be tackled, one of 
the ‘givens’, alongside ‘the flows of water, islands, air, and so forth’, that security relies on (Foucault, 
2007: 19), something which brings benefits (goods and wealth) while also containing risks (of disease 
or theft, for instance). Security seeks to generate and maintain a healthy and productive population 
by producing ‘the best possible circulation, and of minimizing what is risky and inconvenient... while 
knowing that they will never be completely suppressed’. In particular, for Foucault (2007: 65, 
emphasis added), security mechanisms seek to maintain mobility: 
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we see the emergence of a completely different problem that is no longer that of fixing 
and demarcating the territory, but of allowing circulations to take place, of controlling 
them, sifting the good and the bad, ensuring that things are always in movement, 
constantly moving around, continually going from one point to another, but in such a 
way that the inherent dangers of this circulation are cancelled out.  
This point highlights for me the key difference between sovereign or disciplinary power and the 
security mechanisms linked to biopower, and a point I think is under-emphasised in the literature 
applying Foucault to migration governance. Rather than achieving their most intensive interventions 
on bodies that are confined or held in-situ (which is a characteristic of disciplinary power), biopower 
is at its strongest when it is channelling and guiding mobile bodies in such a way as to prevent stasis 
and keep bodies in motion.  
There is a further implication of this observation, which can be drawn out by briefly examining the 
Foucauldian concept of subjectification. For Foucault (2007: 87-114) the linkages between the ‘art of 
government’ and the biopolitical problem of the population led to the emergence of what he calls 
‘governmentality’: the mechanisms through which relations of power are rationalised in order to 
develop the best strategies and techniques to put into effect the government of living beings (rather 
than the administration of legal subjects). This governmentality is not simply directed towards 
making the instruments and mechanisms of government appear legitimate and natural, however: it 
is also intimately connected for Foucault with the production of the subjects of government. For 
Foucault (1982: 777-778), subjects are produced by power, whether that is through systems of 
thought and knowledge production (such as linguistics or economics) which objectivise the subject, 
through ‘dividing practices’ which differentiate between ‘normal’ and ‘abnormal’ subjects (e.g. sane 
and insane, law-abiding and criminal), or through power relations which encourage persons to 
recognise themselves as subjects. In his studies of governmentality, which attempt to connect these 
different practices to the government of living beings, the term ‘subject’ is used by Foucault (1982: 
781) to capture a double-meaning, in the sense of being ‘subject to someone else by control and 
dependence; and tied to [one’s] own identity by a conscience or self-knowledge’: a dual process 
often called ‘subjectification’ (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1983: 168-184). The subjects of 
governmentality are thus ‘free’ subjects, to the extent that ‘[p]ower is exercised only over free 
subjects, and only insofar as they are free’ (Foucault, 1982: 790).  
Biopolitical governance must therefore not be seen as simply channelling, guiding or disrupting 
already-mobile bodies, but also as producing mobile subjects, through what I configure as a dual 
process of enticing mobility from those not already mobile, and maintaining the mobility of already 
mobile subjects. This recognition requires adapting, modifying, and going beyond several strands of 
the critical literature on migration and mobility. The neoliberal critiques of the migration-
development nexus noted above can be situated within an approach that views governmentality as a 
mechanism of governing through freedom and action ‘at a distance’ (Dean, 2010: 23-24; Miller and 
Rose, 1990). While making pertinent observations about the impact of the policies that flow from 
the nexus on migrants, this literature examines the subjectifications that produce migrant labour 
susceptible to the economic demands of governments and employers, and capable of taking on a 
self-conscious role as agents of development. In other words, this is a critique of how migrants are 
subjectivised in ways that serve the purposes of global neoliberal capitalism. What I am interested 
in, however, is how migrants in the UK are made governable, not simply to further the ends of global 
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capitalism, but also as an end in itself, as something internal to the logics of biopower. Furthermore, 
this critique does not provide an account of how the governance of migrants operate through the 
maintenance of their mobility.  
The same can be said of the literatures that apply a Foucauldian analytic of the securing of 
circulation to contemporary migration governance. In much of this literature, the governance of 
migration is seen as a biopolitical problem of managing prior mobility, encountered at specific sites 
such as borders crossings, to allow the ‘good’ circulation of ‘safe’ persons (those travelling for 
business, tourism or education, for example) to occur, while limiting or constraining ‘bad’ 
movements of people (unskilled or unwanted workers, refugees, traffickers, criminals and terrorists) 
(Aradau and Blanke, 2010; Schwenken and Russ-Sattar, 2014). At major UK airports such as 
Heathrow, this can be seen in the way those holding machine-readable UK or EU passports are able 
to pass through automated gates, while other passport holders are required to undergo checks by 
border officials. In both processes, those considered ‘safe’ are waved through, while those 
considered ‘risky’ (whether for intelligence reasons, or due to profiling based on physical appearance 
or digital records) may be taken aside for further questioning, and denied entry if the threat is 
judged to be real. In examples such as this, migration management and border controls can be 
understood to operate as sieves, filters or membranes, allowing certain bodies to pass through 
freely, while others are disrupted, delayed or prevented from entering (Weber and Bowling, 2008: 
360-361). Such a conception of migration management, however, presupposes that bodies are 
already in motion, with border controls and other devices operating to secure certain types of 
desirable mobility from the threats posed by undesirable mobility. This conceptualisation has no 
account of how governance operates as a strategy to entice migrant mobility. 
There are also alternative accounts of migrant mobility which view it as an ‘important resource 
employed by migrants’ and migrant activist groups (Rygiel, 2014: 143). One version of this 
conception can be found within the ‘Autonomy of Migration’ literature. The main argument of this 
approach, as summarised by Scheel (2013), is that migrant agency and subjectivity must be placed at 
the centre of all analyses of population movements, with mobility seen as an ‘immanently political’ 
(Mezzadra, 2004: 275) choice and not the ‘objective’ outcome of independent processes such as 
capital outflows or social crises. A more specific argument about the positive potential of migrant 
mobility is made by scholars who suggest that ‘acts of citizenship’ (Isin, 2008) can be deployed to 
(re)claim citizenship rights for otherwise abject subjects, including the right to unfettered mobility. 
By highlighting ‘the critical potential of an agency-oriented approach, whereby migrants become 
viewed as actors generating change’ (Squire, 2017: 258), this literature provides a vision of mobility 
as something that can ‘function as a political democratic practice’ to ‘claim rights against national 
and transnational structures of power’ (Aradau and Huysmans, 2009: 593).  
What the ‘Autonomy of Migration’ and ‘acts of citizenship’ literatures have in common5, therefore, is 
a vision of migrant mobility as representative of the agency of populations whose movement is prior 
to the governance strategies put in place to control or limit them. However, in my view, this cannot 
provide a convincing alternative to the dominant Foucauldian accounts which focus on security 
mechanisms as sieves or filters, as mobility retains a ‘positive’ dimension in both conceptions. In the 
Foucauldian accounts, mobility is the domain of the privileged, whose right to free circulation is 
secured at the same time as those judged risky or threatening are immobilised (Mountz, 2011: 394). 
This privileged mobility is a product of security mechanisms, but a clear hierarchy is evident in that 
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mobilities judged as ‘good’ are allowed while those judged as ‘bad’ are disallowed. In the alternative, 
migrant-centred accounts, on the other hand, it is the mobility of the under-privileged that is viewed 
in a positive light: as something that pre-exists the attempts to limit or constrain it, or as something 
that can be utilised to challenge or disrupt governance. As I will now discuss, I seek to break this 
dichotomous thinking through my conception of biopolitics as ‘governing through mobility’.  
Governing through mobility 
Rather than viewing mobility as something external that is subjected to security mechanisms, or as 
something that can, in certain specific contexts, challenge or disrupt governing logics, I conceive of 
mobility as also internal to governing logics, as something that biopower seeks to entice and 
maintain. As indicated above, for Foucault biopolitical security mechanisms operate to generate and 
maintain a healthy and productive population by ensuring ‘that things are always in movement, 
constantly moving around, continually going from one point to another’ (Foucault, 2007: 65). This 
means that, while biopolitical security makes calculations about what types of mobility are to be 
sanctioned and what are to be proscribed, what is not in question under these rationalities of 
government is the value of mobility itself. As Tim Creswell (2010: 22) has noted, ‘mobility is one of 
the major resources of 21st-century life’, meaning that the valued subject is that which is willing and 
able to be mobile: to move to look for and take work; to move while in work to generate productive 
links with others; and to engage in wider circuits of mobility around the transfer of goods and 
services6. The promotion of circular and temporary migration by the migration-development nexus 
operates to construct migrants as similarly mobile subjects. The ‘ideal migrants’ from the 
perspective of the migration-development nexus are not those who move to a new country with the 
intention of settling permanently, integrating fully and gaining citizenship rights: rather they are 
those who maintain links with their home communities, transfer regular remittance payments and 
ultimately circulate back to their country of origin, bringing with them the skills and capital they have 
generated during their (temporary) period of migration. The channels open to regular migration are 
therefore designed in such a way as to encourage migrants to maintain links with their country of 
origin (through the facilitation of diasporic networks and remittance transfers), and to consider the 
benefits that return migration could bring to their home community (through deploying their 
improved entrepreneurial skills and increased social and financial capacity upon return); and, at the 
same time, discourages permanent settlement, full integration, and the cutting of all ties with their 
home country. In this way, the policies that flow from the migration-development nexus seek to 
both entice and maintain migrant mobility, by demonstrating the desirability of temporary or 
circular migration.  
We must therefore recognise that governing logics produce mobility. Mobility is not simply a positive 
resource immanent to mobile populations, or a prior phenomenon that security mechanisms seek to 
guide and mange: rather, it is something elicited and maintained by governance mechanisms that 
seek to govern those who are made mobile on the very basis of that mobility. The valorisation of 
mobility through the discourses of the migration-development nexus therefore mark it out as a form 
of biopolitical governance based around the enticement and maintenance of mobile subjects, as a 
form of governance that encourages migrants to view themselves as mobile, and to link their life 
choices and self-assessments of success to their ability to be and remain mobile. It does this by 
enacting a reality in which migration and development are inextricably linked, through the 
production of various types of knowledge: figures for the value of remittance transfers as opposed 
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to direct foreign investment; projections of the economic benefits of labour liberalisation for 
developed countries; and estimates about the contributions that return migrants, loaded with social 
and financial capital, could make to their countries of origin7. The production of this regime of truth 
around migration and development obscures long-standing research into the ‘migration hump’ and 
the extent of the net disparities in terms of economic gain generated between the developed and 
developing world through migration, which challenge and dispute the optimistic pronouncements of 
the migration-development proselytisers. It also masks the legacies of colonial rule that continue to 
influence patterns of both migration and development policy (Danewid, 2017: 1679-1681). In this 
sense, the migration-development nexus is a re-enactment of colonial-era, racialised governing 
logics. One pertinent example from British colonial history is the so-called ‘Natal formula’, through 
which various British colonies enacted immigration policies that excluded non-whites despite being 
formally non-discriminatory towards British subjects, while also making life difficult for those non-
white ‘indentured labourers’ who did migrate, in order to encourage them to return to their own 
colony (Huttenback, 1966). This can be seen as the forerunner to the ever-more restrictive 
immigration framework that has been created in the UK from the 1960s, which has limited non-
white immigration without ever being explicitly racist (Weber and Bowling, 2008: 365), and to the 
recent attempt to create a ‘hostile environment’ for illegal migrants (Travis, 2013).  
The discourses of the migration-development nexus therefore constitute a series of active 
interventions that seek to both entice mobility, by encouraging limited and regular migration, while 
maintaining the mobility of already-mobile subjects, by discouraging permanent settlement and 
valorising migrant circulation or return. This production of mobile subjects may exceed the limits of 
control, generating the situations of resistance and subversion analysed by the ‘Autonomy of 
Migration’ and ‘acts of citizenship’ literatures, but this must not be seen as somehow ‘outside’ or 
separate from the governance strategies such action seeks to disrupt. Mobility must be seen as a 
product of this biopolitical governmentality, and the means through which it governs mobile 
subjects. The migration-development nexus therefore operates to ‘govern through mobility’ by 
attempting to elicit migrant mobility, and through maintaining migrant mobility, in order to produce 
migrants as mobile and movable. I will now consider how this ‘governing through mobility’ operates 
in the context of current UK migration policy. 
Governing through Mobility in the UK 
As discussed above, ‘governing through mobility’ has not found concrete expression in the UK 
through formal processes for facilitating circular migration, diasporic networks and remittance 
transfers. However, if we look at the benefits to migration governance that accrue from the policies 
of the migration-development nexus, and examine the work permit and visa regime operated by the 
Home Office, we can identify the maintenance of a legal framework which acts to encourages non-
EU migrants in the UK to remain mobile through its temporary nature. According to recent data 
released by the Home Office (2018), in 2016 the most popular categories in the ‘points-based 
system’ that applies to most non-EU migrants were the Tier 2 and Tier 5 visas8. 24,300 people were 
granted a Tier 2 ‘General’ visa in 2016, for which the total length of stay is capped at six years. The 
Tier 2 (Intra-company Transfer) visa, open to overseas employees offered a role in a UK branch, was 
granted to 25,300 people in 2016. For long-term staff earning less than £120,000 a year, the 
maximum length of stay on this visa is 5 years, 1 month, though this rises to 9 years for those 
earning more than £120,000 a year. The Tier 5 (Temporary Workers – Creative and Sporting) visa, 
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only valid for a maximum period of twelve months, was granted to 29,000 people in 2016, while 
16,500 people aged 18-30 were granted the Tier 5 (Youth Mobility Scheme) visa, which allows 
residence in the UK for up to 24 months.  
This represents just a snapshot of the UK visa regime, but one that illustrates its variable nature, and 
how the length of stay granted depends on factors such as age, wealth, and the type of work 
undertaken. The explicit references to factors such as salary and savings also tie this visa regime into 
much wider class, racial and gender dynamics by, for example, ignoring how access to high earnings 
or cash reserves are often influenced by nationality or family background, or by promoting a gender-
blind notion of ‘minimum salary’ that does not take into account well-documented gender pay gaps 
(see Andrijasevic, 2009; McDowell, 2008; and Tyler, 2010). What is crucial to my analysis, however, 
is that fact that all these visas are temporary in nature. Once the designated time limit has expired, 
migrants have the opportunity to apply for permanent residence status, if they can meet the 
stringent conditions such as earning at least £35,000 annually. For many migrants such a salary is out 
of reach, meaning that at the end of their visa period they will be legally obliged to migrate to a third 
country or return home. Failure to leave will mean crossing over from a legitimate residence status 
to an irregular one.  
The temporary nature of the UK visa regime has a major impact on migrant integration. As Sumption 
(2017: 50-51) notes, temporary schemes ‘discourage social and economic integration’ by denying 
migrants the time needed to ‘improve their language skills or develop social connections and local 
knowledge’. The imposition of barriers to integration through the temporary nature of the UK visa 
regime contributes further to the production of mobile subjects. Those on the borders of illegality 
and subjected to an atmosphere of generalised suspicion by the statutory requirements on 
landlords, universities, banks, the health service and employers to check immigration status may be 
unable or unwilling to develop deep connections with their communities, making return a more 
attractive option. The migration system may therefore produce migrants who choose to exercise 
their mobility by travelling back to their country of origin. This is borne out in the official figures on 
voluntary return, which show a marked increase from 3,566 in 2004 to a high-water mark of 32,178 
in 2013, before tailing off slightly, but remaining at a level of over 27,500 voluntary returns per year 
in the period 2014-2016 (Home Office, 2017). The growing numbers of voluntary returns has been 
attributed by Myriam Cherti (2017) to both an intensification in ‘the “hostile environment” for 
irregular migrants’ and the ‘strengthening [of] the incentives to return’. The enforcement of this 
‘hostile environment’ has been impacted by the outcry over the treatment of persons from the so-
called ‘Windrush generation’ who, despite possessing indefinite leave to remain, have been denied 
access to public services such as healthcare and threatened with deportation – or in up to 63 cases, 
actually been deported (Grierson, 2018a) – because they lacked the paperwork to comply with the 
higher burden of proof that has been required since the 2014 Immigration Act. The political fallout 
from this scandal has led to the temporary suspension of some requirements upon banks and the 
health service to check immigration status (Grierson, 2018b).  
Furthermore, this legal framework simultaneously operates as a method of control. When 
immigration status is conditional, and when alterations are at the whim of political decisions, 
migrants can be produced as ‘detainable’ or ‘deportable’ (De Genova, 2011: 91-94), as they face the 
possibility of being detained or deported if their legal status changes. The temporary nature of the 
UK visa regime thus produces its subjects as inherently mobile and movable, if permanent residence 
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status is not forthcoming. Furthermore, this fate can befall even the most privileged of non-EU 
migrants, particularly when suspicions over immigration status are folded into national security 
concerns. As The Guardian reported in June 2018, at least 19 highly skilled migrants have been 
deported from the UK under a section of the 2016 Immigration Rules designed to tackle terrorists 
and those judged to be a threat to national security, while up to 1,000 others seeking indefinite 
leave to remain have faced expulsion under the same rules (Hill, 2018). As this case highlights, 
maintaining migrant mobility through the denial of permanent residence makes it easier to take the 
decision to exclude, to revoke immigration status and threaten with deportation. The Guardian also 
report, however, that the government have suspended and placed under review the use of this 
specific paragraph in immigration cases: illustrating how migrants possess the agency to mobilise 
against their governance through mobility. 
Conclusion 
The acceptance of the efficacy of the migration-development nexus by successive UK governments 
has not lead to the creation of clear channels for circulatory migration in order to harness the 
‘developmental potential’ of migrants. Instead, operating within a biopolitical framework which 
views the management of circulation as central to generating and securing a healthy, vital and 
productive population, the discourses of the migration-development nexus, and their valorisation of 
circulation and mobility, have been utilised to enact the biopolitical governance of migrants in the 
UK. Administrated largely through the Home Office, this biopolitical governance produces migrants 
as mobile subjects who are both free to exercise their mobility and subjected to controls due to this 
very mobility. Just as freedom and security have long been recognised not as opposites but as 
correlatives (Foucault, 2007: 48), this article has argued that mobility does not represent a flight 
from governing technologies, but in certain circumstances is produced by governmental rationalities. 
To this end, I have highlighted how the policies which flow from the migration-development nexus 
seek to both entice mobility, by generating (limited) legal channels for migration to take place, and 
maintain migrant mobility, by implementing a bar on integration and permanent settlement. When 
migration is governed by a logic of temporariness or circulation, mobility is not outside this 
governance, but is internal to its operation, in the sense that the production of mobile subjects 
(through a dual process of enticement and maintenance) is necessary for the functioning of this 
biopolitical governance. The operation of this ‘governing through mobility’ therefore depends upon 
the production of mobile and movable migrants, who can then be governed on the basis of that 
mobility. Understanding how mobility is tied to biopolitical governmentality through the migration-
development nexus can therefore allow us to recognise other situations when such governance 
occurs, to understand what effects this has on migrants, and to offer critiques of and challenges to 
the operation of such governmental rationalities. 
As the negotiations and debates over the UK’s future relationship with the EU move towards their 
conclusion, and the details of the UK’s future migration policy emerge, the political focus on the 
inter-related issues of migration, mobility and circulation will likely intensify. This is therefore a 
crucial time to develop the conceptual tools capable of understanding and analysing attempts to 
govern through the production of mobility. It will be particularly interesting to see if circular or 
temporary migration schemes are put forward as means of settling what Feldman (2012) frames as a 
‘neo-nationalist’/‘neo-liberal’ debate, by reconciling contradictory demands for immigration controls 
in order to protect societal cohesion and access to migrant labour in order to safeguard economic 
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interests. Indeed, a Home Office document leaked in September 2017 indicates that the government 
is considering introducing schemes to allow EU nationals to undertake temporary or seasonal work 
on a sector-by-sector basis, in order to fill the likely shortfalls in low-skilled workers created by 
withdrawal from the free movement of labour within the EU (The Guardian, 2017: 46). The extent to 
which withdrawal prefigures further alterations to what the Home Office are now calling the 
‘compliant environment’ for migrants (BBC News, 2018), particularly if the reverberations from the 
‘Windrush scandal’ die down, also demands strict attention. These potential transformations of UK 
migration policy must be tracked closely, and the conceptual framing of 'governing through mobility’ 
developed here can provide the tools needed to identify the governmental consequences of any 
movement towards greater use of temporary visas or circular migration programs.  
My identification of the biopolitics of the migration-development nexus with a process of ‘governing 
through mobility’ is thus far limited in one crucial manner. The analysis put forward here relies on a 
top-down examination of UK migration policy, considering how an environment of temporariness 
and precarity is created by visa regimes and other migration regulations. What is missing is therefore 
a strong engagement with the perception of, and reaction to, this production of mobility from the 
point of view of migrants themselves. By this I mean not only the perspectives of non-EU migrants in 
the UK who have long been subject to such an insecure environment, but increasingly those of 
resident EU citizens who face a situation of uncertainty due to the ongoing negotiations on exiting 
the EU, and indeed of those currently applying to enter the UK, or considering doing so in the future. 
Such research on the lived experiences of migrants, both in the UK and elsewhere, will be necessary 
to gain a fuller understanding of how this biopolitics impacts on their lives and to discern the 
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1 For a critical discussion of the problems in both the academic attempts at defining these concepts, and 
practitioner attempts at making implementable policy recommendations, see Skeldon, 2012. 
2 This body has not meet since October 2015, however. 
3 In Discipline and Punish Foucault (1995: 271-272) considers ‘what is served by the failure of the prison’, in 
order to ask: ‘Is not the supposed failure part of the functioning of the prison?’ 
4 The enclosure of bodies in the prison, and the subjection of prisoners to disciplinary power by surveillance, 
correction and routine, was famously analysed in Discipline and Punish (Foucault, 1995). 
5 This is not to conflate the two literatures or ignore the tensions between them. For a summary of this see 
Nyers, 2015. 
6 Something very clear within the academic world: mobility through different institutions is valued, as is the 
ability to travel to undertake fieldwork and attend conferences. 
7 Publications to this effect can be found on the websites of international organisations engaged with 
migration and development. See, for example, the record of the June 2015 joint meeting of the G20, GFMD, 
and the Global Migration Group, available at https://gfmd.org/news/g20-gfmd-gmg-joint-event. 
8 Information on the UK visa system can be found at https://www.gov.uk/browse/visas-immigration/work-
visas. 
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